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Introduction and summary 
From the second half of 2009 through the end of 2010, 
the U.S. labor market witnessed a systematic increase 
in the rate of job openings while the unemployment rate 
remained essentially unchanged. Some have argued 
that, evidently, the problem in the labor market during 
this period was not that firms were reluctant to hire 
additional workers, but that, for whatever reason, firms 
seemed unable to find suitable workers to staff the 
positions they were trying to fill. By this logic, using 
monetary policy to encourage further hiring by firms 
would have been unlikely to drive down unemployment: 
If firms were already trying to hire but could not, why 
should policy actions that mainly serve to encourage 
even more hiring have any impact on unemployment? 
The unemployment rate did finally register a decline 
in late 2010 and early 2011—a development that may 
eventually render less acute the debate about the need 
for monetary policy to address the problem of high 
unemployment. Still, constructing a framework for 
interpreting such labor market patterns and their policy 
implications remains an important goal. This is espe-
cially true given that there have been other periods in 
which job vacancy rates seemed to rise without a com-
mensurately large fall in unemployment, although those 
episodes were not as dramatic nor as long as the most 
recent one.
In this article, I show how the labor market matching 
function approach developed by Pissarides (1985) and 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) can be used to assess 
the validity of the proposition that recent trends in  
vacancies and unemployment necessarily point to a 
diminished role for monetary policy. More specifically, 
I show that this framework indeed suggests that an 
increase in unemployment without a commensurate 
decline in vacancies can be indicative of a labor market 
shock that monetary policy cannot offset. However, 
this framework can also be used to derive a bound on 
how much a shock of this type can affect unemployment. 
Applying these insights to the period of the Great  
Recession reveals that this type of shock by itself 
would lead to an unemployment rate of 7.1 percent, 
considerably lower than the unemployment rate during 
most of this period. The higher actual unemployment 
rate suggests that other types of shocks, which mone-
tary policy may be able to address, must also be oper-
ating. Hence, the recent patterns in unemployment and 
vacancy data do not necessarily rule out an important 
role for monetary policy. Whether more expansionary 
monetary policy would have been beneficial is a ques-
tion that is beyond the scope of this article. Neverthe-
less, the matching function approach frames this question 
in a potentially useful way—that is, as a question of why 
the value of taking on additional workers appears to be 
so much lower now than in normal economic times.
My article is organized as follows. I begin by  
describing the matching function approach, and then  
I show that the shocks that affect unemployment in 
this framework can be decomposed into two groups—
those that affect the ability of firms to find and hire 
qualified workers and those that affect the value to a 
firm of taking on an additional worker. I next explain 
how the model can be used to predict how a shock to 
the ability of firms to hire, calibrated to match the facts 
on unemployment and vacancies during the Great  
Recession, affects unemployment. Using this result,  
I argue that the increase in unemployment due to this 
shock is much smaller than the actual increase in un-
employment during this period, so a shock to the abil-
ity of firms to hire cannot by itself account for the 
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rise in unemployment during this time. I conclude 
with a discussion about how measurement issues  
are likely to affect these conclusions.
The matching function approach 
In this section, I lay out the key features of the labor 
market matching framework developed in Pissarides 
(1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). This 
framework rests on two key assumptions.
The first key assumption is that the total number 
of new hires h in any given period can be expressed 
as a function of the number of workers who are un-
employed during that period, u, and the number of 
vacancies firms post over that same period, v: 
1)  h = m (u,v).
This assumption is similar to the assumption in-
voked by macroeconomists that one can use an aggre-
gate production function to express total output produced 
in a given period as a function of the total number of 
hours and the aggregate capital stock for that period. 
That is, the process by which unemployed workers 
looking for jobs and employers with vacancies looking 
for workers form new hires is assumed to operate 
with such regularity that one can reliably predict the 
number of new hires per period by using only data on 
the number of unemployed workers and the number of 
vacancies firms post. Empirical analysis supports the 
idea that the number of new hires can be related to the 
number of unemployed and vacant positions in a fairly 
predictable way. Much of this evidence is summarized 
in the survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).1
The function m is referred to as a matching func-
tion. A common restriction on the matching function is 
that the number of new hires h falls short of both the 
number of unemployed u and the number of vacant 
positions v. That is, some unemployed workers and 
some positions will remain unmatched by the end of 
the period. This is meant to capture various frictions 
in the process of filling new jobs from the ranks of 
the unemployed—such as a lack of coordination that 
leads multiple workers to apply to the same vacancies 
while other vacancies remain unfilled, or the fact that 
workers and firms do not initially know how well suited 
they are for each other and figuring this out can be time-
consuming. Studies that explore these frictions in detail 
reveal that they do not always give rise to empirically 
plausible matching functions, and in some cases they 
suggest different interpretations for why hiring, vacan-
cies, and unemployment are related. Moreover, these 
frictions sometimes imply that the number of new 
hires should depend on other variables besides just 
the number of unemployed workers and the number of 
vacant positions.2 However, Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2001) argue that the matching function approach per-
forms quite well empirically and is suitable for ana-
lyzing certain questions concerning the labor market, 
just as assuming an aggregate production function is 
often useful for analyzing macroeconomic questions. 
That is, many macroeconomists are willing to posit 
an aggregate production function that is invariant to 
various shocks that affect the economy, even though 
the conditions under which one can ignore the decisions 
of individual firms in different sectors and express 
aggregate output as a function of aggregate inputs are 
quite stringent.3 In defense of this assumption, these 
macroeconomists would argue that the aggregate pro-
duction function performs well empirically, so it is likely 
to be useful in predicting how the economy would re-
spond to shocks that only affect the aggregate capital 
stock and labor hours—for example, a change in in-
come taxes that affects how much labor is supplied 
but does not affect the technology available for pro-
ducing goods and services. Likewise, advocates of 
the matching function approach view the close empir-
ical relationship between aggregate hiring and aggre-
gate unemployment and vacancies as justification for 
ignoring the decisions of workers and employers that 
underlie the process of job creation. These advocates 
proceed as if hiring can be summarized with a mapping 
of aggregate vacancies and unemployment to aggre-
gate new hires that is “structural,” meaning that the 
mapping is invariant to shocks that affect unemploy-
ment and vacancies but not the frictions inherent in 
the matching process.
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) argue that the 
matching function is particularly well approximated 
by a Cobb–Douglas specification, that is, 
2)  m(u,v) = Auα v1−α,
where A is a scale parameter that determines the pro-
ductivity of the matching process and α reflects the 
sensitivity of the number of new hires to the number 
of unemployed workers. That is, this specification 
will produce reasonably good predictions for the  
actual hiring rate given the unemployment rate u 
and vacancy rate v for coefficients α and A that 
remain stable over relatively long periods and that 
can be estimated from historical data. 
The second key assumption of the labor market 
matching framework is that firms post vacancies as 
long as doing so remains profitable, implying that the 
expected discounted profits to a firm from posting a 
vacancy should be zero in equilibrium. Let J denote 84 3Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
the value of a filled job to the employer who creates it, 
and let k denote the cost of posting (and maintaining) 
the vacancy, including screening and interviewing po-
tential candidates. Then the assumption that employers 
are free to enter the labor market and attempt to hire 
workers as long as it remains profitable to do so implies 
that the value of a filled job times the probability of 
filling it should equal the cost of posting the vacancy, 
ensuring expected profits are equal to zero. Pissarides 
(1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) assume 
that each posted vacancy is equally likely to be matched, 
so with m(u,v) new hires, the probability of filling a 
job is equal to m(u,v)/v. In this case, the implications 







Not all models that give rise to a matching function 
representation as in equation 1 imply that the probability 
that any given firm expects its vacancy to be filled with-
in the relevant period corresponds to m(u,v)/v. For ex-
ample, even when there are underlying differences in 
firms, such as differences in the costs of processing ap-
plicants, we might still observe a stable relationship be-
tween aggregate hiring, unemployment, and vacancies. 
But different firms will assign different probabilities to 
filling their positions within the relevant period. Still, 
as long as m(u,v)/v reasonably captures the probability 
of filling a position for the marginal firm at any point in 
time, proceeding with this assumption will be appropriate.
Substituting the Cobb–Douglas specification for 
m(u,v) from equation 2 into the free-entry condition 
as given by equation 3 reveals that the free-entry con-
dition can be expressed solely in terms of the ratio v/u.4 
This ratio is known in the literature as market tightness, 
since it reflects how many vacant positions are competing 
for each unemployed worker. In particular, the free-entry 
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As long as the parameters α and A remain con-
stant over time, the free-entry condition as given by 
equation 4 tells us that if the value of a filled job rela-
tive to the cost of posting a vacancy, J/k, varies over 
time for any reason (such as a change in aggregate 
demand or changes in aggregate productivity), the 
market tightness ratio, v/u, would have to change as 
well. The fact that v/u changes with J/k ensures that 
firms continue to expect zero cumulative discounted 
profits from posting additional vacancies. Hence, if 
we knew how a particular macroeconomic event  
affected the ratio J/k, we could use the free-entry con-
dition as given by equation 4 to deduce how this event 
should change the ratio of the vacancy rate to the un-
employment rate we observe in the labor market. The 
two assumptions—the existence of a matching function 
and free entry into the labor market—thus impose a lot 
of structure on how various shocks affect labor market 
tightness as reflected in the ratio v/u.5
The Beveridge curve 
With the introduction of one additional assumption, 
the labor market matching framework can be used to 
predict not only how v/u changes with J/k, but also how 
u and v change individually. In particular, suppose that 
the rate at which employed workers separate from jobs 
into unemployment is constant over time. This assump-
tion may seem implausible at first, especially given the 
incidence of mass layoffs during recessions. However, 
the job separation rate that I need to assume is constant 
does not involve one-off spikes of job destruction that 
reflect immediate adjustment by firms to changes in 
economic conditions. Rather, the relevant rate is the 
one that corresponds to what happens in a recession 
once all bursts of job destruction are done.6 Shimer 
(2005a) and Hall (2005) argue that fluctuations in this 
separation rate contribute little to overall changes in 
unemployment and can be ignored. In subsequent work, 
others argue that the separation rate appears to be quite 
cyclically sensitive, and find the separation rate makes 
an important but still relatively small contribution to 
overall fluctuations in unemployment.7 However, their 
papers all look at the role of flows of workers from 
employment and unemployment without accounting 
for spikes of job destruction. Flows into unemployment 
that include bursts of job destruction may account for 
fluctuations in total unemployment, even if the separation 
rate that is relevant for my analysis is fairly stable. Later, 
I argue that data on unemployment and vacancies from 
three distinct episodes of high unemployment support 
the claim that the relevant separation rate, s, does not 
rise much during recessions. Moreover, if the separa-
tion rate were in fact higher during recessions, my cal-
culation would only exaggerate the role of labor market 
mismatch, and the bound I derive for the effect of a 
shock to the ability of firms to hire would be too high. 
To see what the model predicts for the behavior 
of v and u as opposed to their ratio v/u, consider what 
happens if J/k varies over time. Conditional on a given 
value of J/k, the free-entry condition as given by equa-
tion 4 tells us that the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio, 
v/u, must remain constant as long as J/k is constant. 
However, u and v could themselves change even while 85 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
J/k remains fixed, as long as they change in the right 
proportion. Still, one can show that as long as J/k remains 
fixed, u and v will converge to some steady-state values 
that depend on J/k and, moreover, that this convergence 
will be rapid. This quick pace of convergence is not 
just a theoretical result; rather, it has been confirmed 
empirically.8 This finding may seem odd at first, since 
time-series data suggest unemployment is fairly per-
sistent over time. However, it is important to note that 
I am referring to conditional (as opposed to uncondi-
tional) convergence in u and v. In other words, given 
a value of J/k, both u and v converge quickly to the 
steady-state values associated with this particular value 
of J/k. But if J/k follows a persistent process, unemploy-
ment will still appear to change slowly over time. Rapid 
conditional convergence is thus fully consistent with 
unemployment appearing to be a slow-moving process. 
Given that convergence to a steady state for a given 
J/k is quick, it follows that whatever the value of J/k 
happens to be at any point in time, the values of u and 
v we would observe should roughly coincide with the 
steady-state levels of these variables for that J/k. 
To compute the conditional steady-state unemploy-
ment for a given J/k, note that the flow into unemploy-
ment is equal to s(1 − u), where s denotes the separation 
rate into unemployment, while the flow out of unem-
ployment is equal to the number of new hires, Auα v1−α.9 
Since flows into and out of unemployment are equal 
in steady state, I can use this equality to arrive at an 
implicit formula for the conditional steady-state unem-
ployment rate associated with a particular v/u ratio, 









Rearranging equation 5 allows me to express the va-
cancy rate v implied by the model for a given unem-
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As long as the separation rate into unemployment 
s is constant, equation 6 implies a negative relationship 
between u and v. This relationship, when displayed 
graphically as a plot of the vacancy rate against the 
unemployment rate, is known as a Beveridge curve after 
the British economist William Beveridge, who first docu-
mented the negative relationship between the two series. 
The negatively sloped Beveridge curve can be seen 
by plotting out the u and v implied by the model for 
different values of J/k. In particular, according to 
equation 4, changes in J/k will force changes in the 
ratio v/u. Intuitively, as jobs become more valuable, 
the probability of filling a job must fall to ensure firms 
still expect to earn zero profits. One can then deduce, 
from equation 5, that higher values of the ratio v/u 
imply lower values of u and, from equation 6, that 
lower values of u imply higher values of v. 
Indeed, the only thing that induces a movement 
along a Beveridge curve as defined by equation 5 is a 
change in J/k. This result holds because the Beveridge 
curve in equation 5 is defined as the relationship between 
u and v for fixed values of A, α, and s. When these values 
are fixed, it is apparent from equation 5 that the unem-
ployment rate u only changes if the ratio v/u changes. 
But when A and α are fixed, the free-entry condition 
as given by equation 4 tells us that the ratio v/u is en-
tirely determined by J/k. Thus, a movement along the 
Beveridge curve occurs if and only if the value of taking 
on an additional worker relative to the cost of posting 
a vacancy changes. Various events can shift this value, 
including a change in worker productivity, a change in 
the bargaining power of workers, a change in aggregate 
demand, and a change in the employer’s operating cost 
(such as a change to the cost of borrowing). But, for 
our purposes, all of these events can be grouped into 
a catchall category of shocks that affect the net value 
of a filled job or, alternatively, shocks that move the 
economy along a stable Beveridge curve. 
The natural counterpart to shocks that induce a 
movement along a Beveridge curve are shocks that shift 
the Beveridge curve itself. As evident from equation 5, 
which defines the Beveridge curve, as long as s is fixed, 
the only way for the Beveridge curve to shift is if the 
matching function m(u,v) itself somehow changes. 
A shift in the Beveridge curve thus corresponds to a 
shock that changes the way in which workers and em-
ployers come together to form new hires. One example 
of such a shock is a disruption that gives rise to greater 
mismatch between the skills employers require to fill 
their positions and the skills that unemployed workers 
currently possess—such as a shift in demand away from 
products the labor force is already skilled at making. 
Such a shock would presumably result in fewer positions 
being filled given the same number of unemployed 
workers and vacant positions, and thus, the productivity 
term A in the matching function would decline. The 
model thus delivers a clean dichotomy: Shifts of the 
Beveridge curve correspond to shocks to the ability 
of firms to hire (that is, changes in A), while movements 
along a fixed Beveridge curve correspond to changes 
in the incentives for firms to hire (that is, changes in J/k). 86 3Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
We can now recast the debate on the role of mon-
etary policy in the face of high unemployment, using 
the terminology of the matching function approach. 
The observation that vacancies rose while unemploy-
ment was virtually unchanged implies the Beveridge 
curve must have shifted, that is, the hiring process be-
came less efficient. There is arguably little monetary 
policy can do to affect the process by which firms and 
unemployed workers match up to generate new hires. 
However, whether there is any role for monetary policy 
depends on whether a shock to match productivity,  
A, is the only shock responsible for high unemploy-
ment. If the increase in unemployment is also due to 
a change in the relative value of a filled job, J/k, there 
may be some scope for monetary policy after all. So, 
for example, if the lower J/k reflects weak aggregate 
demand due to some underlying frictions, then mone-
tary policy would have a role in addressing this. In 
the remainder of this article, I infer the decline in A 
from the shift in the Beveridge curve, and then I use 
the matching function approach to gauge how much  
a shock to A of this magnitude should have raised un-
employment if the parameters that govern the value 
of a filled job remain equal to their levels during nor-
mal economic times (that is, to pre-recession levels). 
Since the implied unemployment rate falls far short 
of the actual unemployment rate that prevailed during 
this time, the high unemployment rate suggests that 
the relative value of a filled job, J/k, must have been 
lower during this period than during normal econom-
ic times. Whether this finding admits a role for mone-
tary policy depends on why the value of a filled job is 
lower. Still, the calculation suggests that data on un-
employment and vacancies do not rule out a role for 
policy per se and that high unemployment is due not 
only to an inability to hire among employers but also 
to a reduced willingness to hire.
Empirical Beveridge curves and  
estimating the matching function 
The first step in my analysis involves inferring 
the reduction in match productivity A over this period 
from shifts in the Beveridge curve. For this, I must 
begin with a benchmark value for A in normal times. 
I can do this by fitting the Beveridge curve relation-
ship in equation 6 to data from before the recent crisis. 
That is, I estimate the parameters α and A of the matching 
function, using data only for the period before unem-
ployment began to take off, and then I look at how 
this relationship holds up in predicting vacancy rates 
for observed unemployment rates once the unemploy-
ment rate begins to climb. To do this, I use data from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Job Openings 
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which begins 
in December 2000. To estimate the Beveridge curve, 
I use data through August 2008, just before the big 
run-up in unemployment that started a few months 
after the official start date of the recession according 
to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
To estimate α and A, I follow Shimer (2005b)—who 
estimates the job separation rate at a monthly frequency— 
and set s = 0.03. However, the choice of s is essentially 
a normalization.10 To infer A and α, I set out to match 
two specific aspects of the data. First, for each month, 
I use equation 6 to predict a vacancy rate v given an 
unemployment rate u in that month. The parameters 
A and α were chosen to ensure that the average predicted 
vacancy rate over all these months was equal to the 
actual average vacancy rate over the same period, 
namely, 0.029. Second, I chose the parameters to  
ensure that the difference in v between the start date 
and end date of my series, which is 0.013 in the data, 
matched the difference in the predicted v at these two 
dates. Matching the model and the data this way yielded 
values A = 0.75 and α = 0.46. The implied (fitted) 
Beveridge curve corresponds to the dark gray line in 
panel A of figure 1, which is shown together with data 
on unemployment and vacancies. The points in black 
correspond to the data through August 2008 that were 
used to estimate the curve, while the points in red cor-
respond to observations from September 2008 onward 
that were not used in estimating the curve. To help 
illustrate how u and v evolved from September 2008 
onward, consecutive months are connected.
As evident in panel A of figure 1, the Beveridge 
curve implied by the model does a reasonable job  
initially of predicting the vacancy rate at each unem-
ployment rate beyond the period it was estimated to 
match—in fact, beyond the historical range of both 
the unemployment and vacancy series used to estimate 
the curve. The forecast only starts to break down around 
August 2009, suggesting a change in the matching 
function. The fact that the curve fits well throughout 
the official recession as determined by the NBER—
that is, from December 2007 through June 2009—and 
only breaks down afterward provides some reassurance 
that the separation rate, s, did not appear to rise sig-
nificantly while the economy was contracting. 
As a further check on how well the matching 
function approach fits the data, I went back and re-
peated the same exercise for two other periods with 
similarly high unemployment—namely, for November 
1973–March 1975 and for January–July 1980 and 
July 1981–November 1982. Since JOLTS only begins 
in December 2000, I use the Conference Board’s 
Help  -Wanted Advertising Index for my measure of 87 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
vacancies. This index is constructed using the number 
of newspaper advertisements for vacant positions. To 
transform this index into a vacancy rate, I normalized 
the series to coincide with the JOLTS vacancy rate for 
the period in which they overlap. For each recession, 
I followed a similar approach to estimating the matching 
function—that is, by taking data from a period prior 
to the recession to estimate the function and then see-
ing how the implied Beveridge curve does during the 
recession. However, since the Conference Board’s Help-
Wanted Advertising Index may be unreliable over long 
FIguRE 1
Actual and predicted job vacancy rates for given unemployment rates during selected episodes 
A. December 2000  –  February 2011
vacancy rate
Data through August 2008
Data from September 2008 onward
Fitted Beveridge curve
Fitted mismatch curve
B. July 1978  –May 1984
vacancy rate
C. May 1972  –September 1976
vacancy rate
unemployment rate unemployment rate
unemployment rate
Notes: All curves are fitted only on data indicated by the black points. The fitted mismatch curves are based on Shimer (2007).  
See the text for further details.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey 
and civilian unemployment rate series; and Conference Board, Help-Wanted Advertising Index, from Haver Analytics. 
Data through December 1979
Data from January 1980 onward
Fitted Beveridge curve
Fitted mismatch curve
Data through October 1973
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periods (given various gradual changes in the tenden-
cy of employers to rely on newspaper advertising for 
recruiting), I restrict attention to shorter periods for my 
estimation. For the 1973–75 recession, I look at the 
18-month period before the NBER peak date, that is, 
May 1972 through October 1973. For the 1980 and 
1981–82 recessions, I look at the 18-month period be-
fore the NBER peak date for the 1980 recession, that is, 
July 1978 through December 1979. In both cases, I esti-
mate A and α in the same manner as for the data between 
December 2000 and August 2008—that is, I choose 88 3Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
mismatch model predicts that the vacancy rate should  
decline more rapidly with unemployment than either 
what my estimated Beveridge curves predict or what 
we actually observe in the data. Since a shift in the 
curve in Shimer’s model can be thought of as a shock 
to the ability of unemployed workers and job vacancies 
to match up with one another, this would suggest that 
all three recessionary periods and their subsequent re-
coveries were associated with significant rises in mis-
match. While this reading of the data is certainly possible, 
it is striking that much of the discussion of the role of 
labor market mismatch during the Great Recession has 
tended to treat this phenomenon as exceptional; many 
of the explanations for the rise in mismatch in the labor 
market over the course of the Great Recession have em-
phasized features that are unique to this episode, such 
as the unprecedented collapse in house prices. Such 
views seem at odds with a specification that implies all 
three recessionary periods were associated with similarly 
large increases in labor market mismatch. The matching 
function approach is therefore more consistent with 
the view that the most recent episode is exceptional.
these parameters so that the average predicted vacancy 
rate over the period is equal to the actual average and 
the difference in vacancy rates between the start and 
end dates is the same in the predicted series as in the 
actual series. The estimated coefficients are reported 
in table 1, and the implied (fitted) Beveridge curves 
are illustrated as dark gray lines in the panels of fig-
ure 1 (the light gray lines are explained in the next 
paragraph). For the 1973–75 recession (panel C) and 
the 1980 and 1981–82 recessions (panel B), the data 
points used to estimate the curves are depicted in 
black, while the remaining data points are depicted in 
red. Note that in both panels B and C of figure 1, the 
original Beveridge curves are estimated from a period 
with little variation in the data, especially in the case 
of the 1980 and 1981–82 recessions. Still, the approach 
to using data before the recession(s) to estimate a curve 
performs well. For all of the recessionary periods I con-
sider, the vacancy rate predicted for a given unemploy-
ment rate remains close to the actual vacancy rate 
once unemployment begins to rise. In both panels B 
and C of figure 1, the Beveridge curves do eventually 
appear to shift, although the shifts are much smaller 
than in the most recent episode, shown in panel A of 
figure 1. As evident in table 1, the coefficient α is es-
timated to be essentially the same in all three periods. 
This is consistent with my maintained approach of as-
suming the parameter α is fixed and that any changes 
in the matching function must therefore be attributed 
to A, the match productivity parameter. 
For comparison, I also considered an alternative 
explanation for the matching function based on the 
notion of mismatch advanced by Shimer (2007), which 
was used by Kocherlakota (2010) to analyze the same 
labor market trends I consider here. The Shimer (2007) 
mismatch model offers a different interpretation for 
the relationship between new hires and unemployment 
and vacancies, and leads to a different zero-profit con-
dition from equation 3.11 Shimer’s (2007) model also 
involves two parameters, which he denotes m and n. 
As I did earlier, I use the period before the recent run-
up in unemployment (and the   18-month period before 
the start of the NBER recession for the two earlier epi-
sodes) to estimate these parameters and then consider 
how the model performs when unemployment rises. 
Following Kocherlakota (2010), in each case I choose 
these parameters to match the average values of u and 
v in the earlier period that is meant to reflect normal 
economic times. The estimates for the two parameters 
in each of the three episodes are summarized in table 2, 
and the implied curves relating unemployment and 
vacancies are shown in the respective panels in figure 1 
in light gray. In all three episodes, Shimer’s (2007) 
TaBlE 1 
Estimated parameters for a Cobb–Douglas  
matching function
  A  α
May 1972–October 1973   0.68  0.42
July 1978  –December 1979    0.56  0.43
December 2000    –August 2008   0.75  0.46
Note: See the text for further details.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S.  
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover 
Survey and civilian unemployment rate series; and Conference 
Board, Help-Wanted Advertising Index, from Haver Analytics.
 
TaBlE 2
Estimated parameters for the Shimer (2007) 
mismatch model
  m  n
May 1972–October 1973   168.7  165.8
July 1978  –December 1979    119.7  118.0
December 2000    –August 2008   210.5  205.5
Note: See the text for further details.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S.  
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover 
Survey and civilian unemployment rate series; and Conference 
Board, Help-Wanted Advertising Index, from Haver Analytics.89 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Inferring the extent of mismatch 
After estimating the parameters associated with 
the Beveridge curve for normal economic times, I next 
turn to how the decline in match productivity A can 
be inferred from the apparent shift in the Beveridge 
curve following the most recent recession. Using data 
through August 2008, I know that the initial productivity 
of the matching function is given by A0 = 0.75. I can 
deduce the value of A1 needed to match a given unem-
ployment and vacancy pair at any other point in time 
by using equation 6. For example, to match the data 
for December 2010, when u = 0.094 and v = 0.022, 
match productivity A1 must solve
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Solving for A1 yields A1 = 0.633, that is, by 
December 2010 the productivity of the matching  
function declined 16 percent from its original level 
before the recession. Figure 2 shows the Beveridge 
curves for both values of A0 (the dark 
gray line) and A1 (the light gray line). 
In principle, I can fit a new Beveridge 
curve through any data point. The most  
recent observation at the time of this 
writing, for February 2011, lies on the 
same Beveridge curve implied by the 
data from December 2010, as evident in 
figure 2. Moreover, this curve is close to 
the highest curve one could fit through 
any of the data points between September 
2008 and the end of the JOLTS sample. 
This leads me to focus on the curve that 
runs though the data point corresponding 
to December 2010 in measuring the de-
cline in match productivity A.
An alternative way to infer the change 
in A over the course of the Great Recession 
would be to bring in additional data on new 
hires rather than only rely on the data for 
unemployment and vacancies. The idea is 
as follows. Since m(u,v) corresponds to the 
number of new hires, which is measured 
in JOLTS, I can take the number of new 
hires and divide by the expression uαv1−α, 
using my previous estimate of α = 0.46. 
In principle, this should give me a time 
series for match productivity A. This im-
plied time series is depicted in figure 3.  
If I consider the period between August 
2008 and December 2010, the implied match produc-
tivity declined by about 20 percent—a little larger 
than what I get without using hiring data and looking 
only at the implied shift in the Beveridge curve. How-
ever, as evident from figure 3, match productivity us-
ing data on new hires starts to fall around December 
2007, considerably before any indications of a shift in 
the Beveridge curve relating unemployment and vacan-
cies. The decline in match productivity between  
December 2007 and December 2010 is thus much larger, 
on the order of 25–30 percent. However, this decline 
is sensitive to the value of α, and it corresponds to 
20 percent if I set α = 0.40 instead of 0.46. But regard-
less of the precise value for α, data on hires suggest 
the decline in match productivity begins much earlier 
than the shift in the Beveridge curve. That said, both 
the magnitude and timing of the decline of matching 
efficiency depend on the measure of new hires used. 
Barnichon and Figura (2010) use the flows from un-
employment to employment rather than all new hires, 
and find that the decline in A in 2009 is sharp, and its 
magnitude is comparable to what I estimate using the 
Beveridge curve.
FIguRE 2
Fitting Beveridge curves during the Great Recession
vacancy rate
Note: See the text for further details.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and civilian 
unemployment rate series, from Haver Analytics. 
unemployment rate
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Veracierto (2011) reviews several 
different approaches to estimating the 
productivity of the matching function, 
based on shifts of the Beveridge curve. 
These include accounting for flows into 
and out of nonemployment (see note 1,  
p. 94), measuring new hires based on 
flows into employment from either just 
unemployment or both unemployment 
and nonemployment, and using either 
shifts of the Beveridge curve or a com-
parison of changes in new hires to changes 
in unemployment and vacancies to de-
duce a time series for A. His preferred 
estimate suggests A had declined 15 per-
cent since December 2007, in line with 
the estimate I infer from the shift in the 
Beveridge curve.
Since my calculations rely on the 
Beveridge curve specification in equation 5, 
I will use the estimate for the change in  
A based on how much the Beveridge curve 
shifted during the Great Recession in 
what follows.
The effects of mismatch  
on unemployment 
Once I determine that match productivity A de-
clined by 16 percent between the level I estimate for 
normal economic times and the end of 2010, I can  
determine the effect of a shock of this size on the un-
employment rate. To do this, I start at a steady-state 
unemployment rate of  5 percent, which roughly cor-
responds to the historical average of unemployment 
for the period covered by JOLTS through August 2008. 
From the Beveridge curve relationship implied by 
equation 6, I know the implied vacancy rate would 
have to be
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The implied ratio of u/v during these normal times 






Next, I use the free-entry condition as given by 
equation 4 to deduce how much a shock to A will affect 
the ratio u/v. To do this, suppose the shock to A had no 
effect on the ratio of the value of a filled job to the cost 
of posting a vacancy, J/k. In fact, J and k are determined 
endogenously, and changes in A can, and in many cases 
will, affect these values. However, for reasons I explain 
in more detail later, changes in A are likely to move 
J/k in a particular direction, implying that the unem-
ployment rate holding J/k fixed will correspond to an 
upper bound on unemployment. Assuming J/k is con-
stant thus offers a useful benchmark case.















Hence, given the estimated decline in the productivity 
of matching, holding J and k fixed, a decrease in A from 
0.75 to 0.633 should lead the unemployment-to-vacancy 
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Given I needed the ratio u/v to equal 1.67 to support 
a 5 percent unemployment rate under the original 
Beveridge curve, I can deduce that the new equilibrium 
ratio of u/v will equal
1.45 × 1.67 = 2.42.
Plugging in u/v = 2.42 into the Beveridge curve 
relationship in equation 5 when A1 = 0.633 gives us 
the implied unemployment rate that must prevail in 
the new equilibrium:
FIguRE 3
Implied match productivity using data
on new hires, 2001–11
ratio of hiring rate to aggregate of unemployment and vacancy rates
Notes: The red vertical line corresponds to August 2008—the date  
at which the sample used to estimate the Beveridge curve in figure 1,  
panel A, ends. See the text for further details.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and civilian 
unemployment rate series, from Haver Analytics. 
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Thus, a shock to A, calibrated to the magnitude 
implied by the patterns observed in data on unemploy-
ment and vacancies alone, will raise the unemployment 
rate to 7.1 percent as long as it leaves the value of a 
filled job unchanged. Since 7.1 percent is much lower 
than the actual unemployment rate, this value suggests 
that shocks to the productivity of matching alone can-
not account for the high unemployment rate. 
Figure 4 illustrates the same calculation graphically. 
Each level of match productivity A is associated with 
a distinct Beveridge curve and a distinct ratio u/v deter-
mined by the free-entry condition as given by equation 4, 
which in the figure corresponds to the line emanating 
from the origin. The original Beveridge curve and 
free-entry condition associated with A = A0 are shown 
in dark gray, while the new Beveridge curve and free-
entry condition associated with A = A1 are shown in light 
gray. A decline in A not only shifts the Beveridge curve 
but also rotates the free-entry condition clockwise to 
a degree that depends on the size of α. 
Intuitively, if hiring becomes less effective, 
firms will have an incentive to post fewer 
vacancies per unemployed worker, ulti-
mately leaving more workers unemployed. 
As I noted earlier, both k and J are in 
fact determined endogenously and will 
likely change when A does. For example, 
the process of creating a vacancy requires 
productive inputs such as labor, so the 
cost k will depend on wages that are de-
termined endogenously. Since wages tend 
to rise and fall with economic activity both 
in the data and in the original Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994) model, I would ex-
pect the cost of posting a vacancy k to 
fall as the unemployment rate rises. As 
for the value of a filled job to an employer 
J, there are various reasons to suspect it 
will be higher when there is more unem-
ployment. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
posit that the value of a filled job is de-
termined as the result of Nash bargaining 
between workers and firms over the sur-
plus from a match.12 But the surplus from 
matching is higher when v/u is low, so a 
fall in A will lead to a higher value for 
J.13 Intuitively, when it is easy to find a 
match, matching immediately is only 
slightly more valuable than separating and 
letting the two parties search for new 
matches, which they will likely find quickly. More gener-
ally, various realistic features that are absent in the bench-
mark model, such as curvature in the utility function 
and diminishing returns to labor, would tend to make 
a marginal job more valuable when fewer workers are 
employed. Essentially, diminishing marginal utility or 
diminishing marginal returns make another employed 
worker more valuable when fewer workers are employed. 
If both k falls and J rises at higher unemployment 
rates, the effect of a shock to A on u/v would only be 
smaller. As such, 7.1 percent should be viewed as an 
upper bound rather than a point estimate.14 This result 
only reinforces the point that the high unemployment 
rate that was observed during this period should not 
be blamed solely on a decline in the ability of firms to 
fill their positions, but also on greater reluctance among 
firms to hire as reflected in a lower J/k.
Measurement issues
The calculations presented in the preceding sec-
tion are based on the assumption that the inputs that 
go into creating new matches—namely, unemployment 
FiguRe 4
Computing unemployment response from shock 
to match productivity A 
vacancy rate
Note: See the text for further details.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and 
civilian unemployment rate series, from Haver Analytics. 
unemployment rate
u/v = 1.67
u/v = 2.42 
Data, December 2000  –  August 2008
Data, September 2008–February 2011
Beveridge curve, December 2010
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and vacancies—are measured accurately. However, there 
are reasons to suspect both series may systematically 
misrepresent the nature of inputs that enter the hiring 
process while the empirical Beveridge curve shifted.  
I now discuss each of these series in turn, as well as 
the implications of mismeasurement for my analysis. 
I will argue that in both cases, measurement issues 
only strengthen the conclusion that the decline in the 
ability of firms to hire cannot by itself account for the 
bulk of the increase in unemployment during this period.
I first consider the unemployment series. One 
distinguishing feature of the current episode of high 
unemployment is the exceptionally long duration of 
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits; in some U.S. 
states, the unemployed can receive UI benefits for up 
to 99 weeks. Indeed, several research papers have sought 
to estimate the effect of these extensions on both the 
unemployment rate and unemployment durations.15 The 
extension of UI benefits can matter for my analysis in 
several ways, including the method by which unemploy-
ment is measured. First, though, it will be useful to re-
view the various ways in which explicitly incorporating 
UI benefits into the model can matter for unemployment.
One reason UI benefits can matter is that they 
lower the cost of remaining unemployed, allowing 
workers to be more selective about which job they 
take. As a result, relative to the case in which UI ben-
efits remained unchanged, unemployed workers will 
prefer to continue searching more often, and a smaller 
fraction of the contacts between unemployed workers 
and vacant positions will result in a match, that is, a 
new hire. Indeed, this provides one potential explana-
tion for the apparent decline in match productivity. 
Note that this effect is already taken into account in 
the calculation I sketched out before; that calculation 
tells us how much a decline in the ability of firms to 
hire—for whatever reason—ought to affect unemploy-
ment. Indeed, all the papers estimating how much the 
extension of UI benefits contributed to unemployment 
find effects that are smaller than the bound I estimate. 
Second, when a worker and an employer agree  
to form a match, the extension of UI benefits may  
require an employer to offer a worker higher wages 
given that more generous UI benefits improve the 
bargaining position of workers. This effect is empha-
sized in Kocherlakota (2011). Unlike the first effect 
that appeared as a lower value for A, this effect would 
show up directly as a lower value for J, the value of 
filling a job to an employer. Indeed, this may be one 
reason for why the value of a filled job to an employer 
appears to be lower now than it is in normal times. 
Neither of these two effects poses a problem for 
determining whether the rise in unemployment can be 
attributed solely to a decline in the ability of firms to 
hire. Rather, they merely suggest potential interpreta-
tions for what might be driving shocks to A or J. 
However, there is a third potential implication of ex-
tending UI benefits that may act to distort measured 
unemployment and could pose a problem for my calcu-
lation. In particular, extended UI benefits may encour-
age disaffected workers who prefer to leave the labor 
force to present themselves as nominally unemployed 
in order to qualify for UI benefits. This will be the 
case even if such workers are not actively looking for 
a job beyond whatever token steps are needed to main-
tain their status. Such a phenomenon would make the 
measured unemployment rate seem higher than its 
true value. Formally, let u* denote the fraction of the 
labor force that is actively looking for jobs, and let u0 
denote the fraction of the labor force that is not really 
looking for a job but reports itself as being unemployed. 
If the latter fraction literally takes no steps to search 
for a job, the matching process will only partner up 
the true unemployment and vacancy positions, and 
the number of hires will be given by
8)  h = m (u*,v).
At the same time, the official unemployment series 
will correspond to u = u* + u0   , leading us to expect 
m(u* + u0  ,v) hires. Since the matching function is in-
creasing in both arguments, this will make the matching 
process appear less efficient than it truly is: We would 
observe surprisingly few hires given the seemingly large 
number of unemployed. Hence, the decline in match 
productivity A inferred from the shift in the Beveridge 
curve would exceed the true decline in A that enters 
the free-entry condition as given by equation 4. Since 
my approach provides an upper bound on the effect 
of a decline in the ability to hire on unemployment, 
though, overstating the decline in match productivity 
A will not overturn my results. If anything, it suggests 
the unemployment rate that should be expected from 
the decline in the ability of firms to hire is actually 
smaller than 7.1 percent.
Next, I turn to the time series for vacancies. Recent 
work by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010) 
has called into question whether vacancies provide a 
consistent measure of recruiting effort over time. In 
particular, they show that the vacancy yield, or the  
ratio of hires per vacancy, varies systematically across 
employers. For example, growing firms seem to be 
better at hiring, in the sense of being able to hire more 
workers per each vacancy posted. Davis, Faberman, 
and Haltiwanger (2010) argue that this pattern arises 
because the process of hiring requires firms to invest 93 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
some effort into recruiting beyond posting the number 
of vacant positions they are seeking to fill.16 They fur-
ther reason that the same pattern should also occur over 
the business cycle: In recession times, when overall 
hiring is low, firms are likely to put in less effort into 
recruiting than in boom times. Thus, employers’ hiring 
efforts would decline by more than would be reflected 
in the time series for the number of vacancies posted.17 
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010) formal-
ize these concerns as follows. Suppose that the effort 
that firms invest in recruiting can be summarized by 
the product of q and v, where q denotes recruiting 
intensity and v denotes the vacancy rate. The total 
number of hires is then given by 
9)  h = m (u,qv).
That is, matching depends not on the number of va-
cancies, but vacancies together with how much firms 
invest in filling these vacancies. When recruiting in-
tensity q falls below its historical average, the time 
series for vacancies v will fail to register this and will 
therefore overstate the overall recruiting effort. Using 
vacancies to proxy for recruiting efforts will then make 
matching efficiency appear to fall more than it in fact 
does. That is, we may wrongly conclude that firms 
find it more difficult to hire when in fact they are vol-
untarily choosing to search in a way that reduces the 
odds of hiring. Once again, this will cause us to over-
state the decline in match productivity A from apparent 
shifts in the Beveridge curve and, therefore, to overstate 
the increase in the unemployment rate that can be attrib-
uted to less efficient matching now than in the past.
To provide a more quantitative illustration of this 
result, I can use the suggestion in Davis, Faberman, and 
Haltiwanger (2010) of proxying for recruiting intensity 
q by using the way in which the vacancy yield (hires per 
vacancy) varies across firms with different hiring rates. 
In particular, using variation in the vacancy yield across 
firms, they conclude that the elasticity of q with respect 
to overall firm hiring is given by 0.72. This implies set-
ting q = h  0.72. Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010) 
provide some evidence that this modification improves 
the time-series fit of the matching function. If this proxy 
is accurate, I can simply repeat the calculation for how 
much the apparent decline in match productivity should 
have increased unemployment, but replace the vacancy 
rate v in equations 1 through 6 with h  0.72 v as the second 
argument in the matching function.18 Fitting a Beveridge 
curve to data on unemployment and this adjusted va-
cancy series through August 2008 yields A0 = 0.7 and 
α = 0.54. To match the data for December 2010 requires 
A1 = 0.605, which is a smaller decline of only about 
14 percent. For this decline, the implied unemployment 
rate due to just this shock to match productivity would 
be at most 6.3 percent. Correcting for measurement 
problems in vacancies can thus have a significant impact 
on how much unemployment is attributed to reduced 
effectiveness in hiring.
Conclusion 
Recent labor market trends have raised concerns 
that the unemployment rate is high not because employ-
ers are reluctant to hire but because they are unable to 
hire—that is, for whatever reason, firms are unable to 
find suitable workers to staff the positions they are trying 
to fill. These concerns, if true, would cast doubt on using 
monetary policy to stimulate the labor market, since it 
works by encouraging firms to hire more. The matching 
function approach pioneered by Pissarides (1985) and 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) offers a framework for 
analyzing these issues. In particular, that framework can 
be used to separate the shocks that drive unemployment 
into two groups: shocks that affect the probability of 
finding a suitable worker and shocks to the value a 
worker generates once hired. The same framework  
allows us to estimate how much the probability of 
finding a worker declined and to compute a bound on 
how much this effect by itself would raise the unemploy-
ment rate. This bound as I have calculated it suggests 
that a decline in the ability to hire accounts for less than 
half of the total rise in unemployment during the Great 
Recession and that part of this rise in unemployment 
must be because firms find hiring less profitable. 
While there is little monetary policy can do if firms 
find it more difficult to find suitable workers, there 
may be scope for monetary policy when firms find it 
less profitable to hire workers than during normal times. 
Whether such a role for monetary policy is warranted 
depends on why the value of a filled job to an employer 
is lower than in normal times. For example, if filled 
jobs are less valuable because of a shock that makes 
workers less productive, there is arguably little that 
monetary policy should do in response. But if jobs are 
less valuable because of insufficient aggregate demand 
on account of some market friction, there may be a 
role for monetary policy to stimulate demand. The key 
question for policy, then, is not what unemployment 
and vacancy data tell us about the possibility of mis-
match, but why firms seem to find hiring workers less 
attractive than usual. Unfortunately, while the matching 
function approach is useful in pointing out the value 
of a filled job to an employer as an important variable, 
it offers little direct guidance as to why this value is 
so much lower now relative to normal times.94 3Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
1Of course, newly hired workers do not come only from the ranks 
of the unemployed; some were employed elsewhere, while others 
were not employed but did not report actively looking for a job  
either (that is, they were classified as “not in the labor force” by  
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, per the definition available at 
www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm#nilf). In practice, the hiring rate 
can be accounted for quite well using data on unemployment, per-
haps because the number of hires from out of the labor force and 
the number of hires of already employed workers move in opposite 
directions over the business cycle and tend to offset one another. 
One way to avoid the logical inconsistency of using data on unem-
ployment to explain all new hires regardless of whether the worker 
was previously unemployed is to replace the number of new hires 
in equation 1 with the flow of workers from unemployment to em-
ployment, as in Barnichon and Figura (2010) and Veracierto (2011). 
While this approach restricts attention only to new hires who were 
previously unemployed, it suffers from the problem that the total num-
ber of vacancies is an imperfect measure of firm inputs into hiring the 
unemployed, since firms’ efforts to fill these vacancies are aimed at 
hiring all workers and not just workers who are already unemployed.
2Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey the microfoundations of 
the matching function, although several important papers in this area 
were published after their survey. The traditional model of coordi-
nation frictions, due to Butters (1977), assumes firms post vacancies, 
workers submit a single application each to some vacancy chosen 
at random, and each firm hires at random among the applications it 
receives. Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) emphasize that this model 
does not give rise to empirically plausible matching functions and 
that the number of hires per period will depend on additional vari-
ables, such as the size distribution of firms. Albrecht, Gautier, and 
Vroman (2003) assume workers can apply to multiple vacancies, 
but this does not give rise to empirically plausible specifications  
either. Lagos (2000) and Shimer (2007) model coordination frictions 
by letting firms and workers end up at different locations; firms choose 
locations at random and workers choose locations optimally to maxi-
mize their expected earnings (per Lagos) or at random (per Shimer). 
There are no frictions at any given location, so whichever side (firms 
or workers) arrives in smaller numbers winds up fully matched. Thus, 
each location will remain with either unemployed workers or vacant 
positions, but not both. Unemployed workers and vacancies are thus 
not inputs into forming new hires as the matching function approach 
implicitly assumes, but consequences of poor coordination between 
employers and workers on where to locate. When workers choose 
locations optimally, the matching function is not empirically plau-
sible. When workers instead choose locations at random, the matching 
function matches the data well, at least for a certain range of unem-
ployment and vacancies rates. Stevens (2007) develops a different 
theory of the matching function based on the notion that workers 
take time to screen heterogeneous jobs, rather than on coordination 
problems. She finds that the implied aggregate matching function 
is approximately Cobb–Douglas, as in equation 2 (p. 83). Decreuse 
(2010) develops a model where workers apply to jobs they do not 
realize are already filled. He finds that the implied matching function 
will depend on lagged variables beyond just the contemporaneous 
numbers of unemployed workers and vacant positions.
3For a survey that criticizes the use of aggregate production func-
tions, see Felipe and Fisher (2003). 
4The same is true more generally for any specification m(u,v) that 
exhibits constant returns to scale. 
5It should be noted that a recent body of literature, starting with 
Shimer (2005b), argues that the matching function approach suffers 
from serious shortcomings in its ability to match various labor mar-
ket facts over the business cycle. However, this critique concerns 
whether the value of a filled job to the employer who creates it, J, 
varies enough over the cycle in these models, not whether the match-
ing function can explain how new hires vary with unemployment 
and vacancies. My calculation does not depend on how J varies 
with aggregate conditions, nor does it impose much structure on 
how J ought to change over the cycle; and hence, it is not subject 
to this critique.
6More precisely, consider the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model 
where the separation rate into unemployment is endogenous. That 
model assumes jobs are hit with idiosyncratic shocks to the profit-
ability of any given job at a constant rate λ per unit time. The shock 
term ε is drawn each time from some fixed distribution F. Firms 
optimally choose to terminate a job and send the worker into un-
employment for severe enough shocks, that is, when ε falls below 
some critical level εd . Suppose that in a recession, firms become more 
demanding and raise the critical level to some higher value εd
'.When 
the shock associated with the recession first hits, the unemployment 
rate will jump and the flow into unemployment will spike as all jobs 
whose ε lies between εd and εd
' will be terminated immediately. The 
spike in the separation rate will appear large even when the regular 
flow into unemployment λF(εd) changes only modestly. My assump-
tion that the separation rate is constant over time only requires that 
λF(εd ) is relatively stable, not that flow rates from employment to 
unemployment (which will reflect spikes) be stable.
7Some examples are Mazumder (2007); Fujita and Ramey (2009); 
and Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010).
8In particular, Shimer (2005a) shows that the steady-state unemploy-
ment level to which the economy should be converging at any point 
in time can be readily computed from flows into and out of unemploy-
ment at that instant. He then shows that this steady state is nearly 
always close to actual unemployment. 
9Barnichon and Figura (2010) and Veracierto (2011) also take 
into account flows between unemployment and not in the labor 
force in computing steady-state unemployment, which I ignore. 
Acknowledging that out of the labor force is a distinct labor market 
state does not change my ultimate conclusion that steady-state un-
employment and vacancies will appear negatively related, although 
it may affect the shape of the curve relating the two series and how 
much we should conclude it may have shifted over time. I return to 
these issues later. 
10Formally, as evident in equation 6, the Beveridge curve only depends 
on the ratio s/A. The levels of s and A depend on the frequency 
used to measure flows between labor market states.
11In particular, the probability of profitably hiring a worker in the 
Shimer (2007) model will not equal m(u,v)/v. Instead, it corresponds 
to the equilibrium fraction of locations with more workers than jobs. 
Employers in locations with more jobs than workers may still hire, 
but will earn zero profits. Although the probability of a profitable 
hire differs from m(u,v)/v, this probability will still be negatively 
related to v in equilibrium.
12Nash bargaining is one rule on how to divide a given amount of 
resources between two parties. This particular rule for how to divide 
resources was proposed by Nash (1950), who showed this rule had 
various desirable properties. Since employers and workers must divide 
the surplus that results from their joint production, Nash’s solution 
has often been applied to determine the wage that workers receive.  
13Kocherlakota (2011) shows that under Nash bargaining, J rises by 
nearly as much as A falls, so labor market tightness v/u is essentially 
the same regardless of A. In figure 4, keeping v/u unchanged but 
shifting the Beveridge curve up to the value associated with A1 would 
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imply an unemployment rate of no more than 6 percent. But as 
hinted at in note 5, Nash bargaining is a somewhat problematic  
assumption, since for standard parameterizations it implies that 
productivity shocks produce fluctuations in J that are too small 
to explain business cycle volatility.
14In informal communication, Rob Shimer computed the effects 
of a 16 percent drop in the productivity of the matching function  
in a fully worked out equilibrium model with concave utility and 
declining marginal product of labor. He found that the unemploy-
ment rate would rise from 5 percent to 5.8 percent. This suggests 
my bound may be a substantial overestimate of the true effect.
15See, for example, Aaronson, Mazumder, and Schechter (2010); 
Valletta and Kuang (2010); Fujita (2011); Mazumder (2011); and 
Hu and Schechter (2011). 
16More precisely, lower effort should be viewed as a change in 
some unobserved determinant of hiring that results in lower hiring 
rates for the same number of vacancies while holding unemployment 
fixed. This change may reflect lower effort—for example, firms may 
spend fewer resources on advertising a position or on screening 
and interviewing potential candidates. But alternatively, recruiters 
may raise the standards they expect from workers, which would 
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